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Abstract:  
Throughout recent year food quality standards have become a ubiquitous phenomenon that 
nationally and globally influences agri-food markets. With equilibrium models commonly 
used in the quantitative analysis of market and trade effects, we review possible approaches to 
modeling standards existent in the literature, elaborate the reasoning behind them and discuss 
their suitability to reflect “real world” situations. While the modeling approaches identified 
may respectively depict a specific situation, they may not be appropriate in others. That is 
they capture certain effects of standards only. With increasing ability to account for the 
various effects of standards, the modeling approaches become more complex and the data 
requirements increase. 
 
JEL classification: F1, C6, Q18 
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1. Introduction 
Throughout recent years food quality that not only refers to food safety but also 
includes aspects of animal welfare and environmental protection has become increasingly 
important in high-income countries such as the European Union (EU). However, due to the 
specific characteristics of food quality, information asymmetries prevail in the food market 
and hence market failure occurs. That leads to an inadequate provision of high quality 
products as Akerlof (1970) describes in his famous article about the “lemon problem”. In 
order to ensure a satisfactory level of food quality, governments of high-income countries 
have implemented more and tighter standards for agri-food products. At the same time, 
producers in the agri-food sector have also established their own systems of quality standards 
so as to differentiate their products from those of competitors and hence to secure their 
position in the agri-food market. 
In a globalized world, where agri-food markets are further liberalized, agri-food trade 
between countries increases and consumers more and more demand food products of high 
quality, agri-food standards can be considered to play an increasingly prominent role. In fact, 
standards have become a ubiquitous phenomenon that nationally and globally influences agri-
food markets (Josling et al., 2003). With equilibrium models commonly used to quantitatively 
analyze market and trade effects, the question of how to appropriately depict standards arises. 
However, there are only few attempts to incorporate standards into equilibrium models. This 
may be due to the considerable difficulty in modeling standards appropriately as well as in 
obtaining the necessary data. 
In this paper, we examine approaches of modeling standards already existent in the 
literature so as to contribute to a better understanding of how to adequately incorporate 
standards in equilibrium models. To start with, we define standards in general and give 
examples of the different categories of standards - especially with regard to the EU agri-food 
sector. With this background information, we then present four possible approaches to model   3
standards in equilibrium models, elaborate the reasoning behind them and discuss their 
suitability to reflect “real world” situations. The last chapter summarizes our findings and 
draws some conclusions. 
2. Background 
In general, standards can be classified in various ways. Josling et al. (2003) for example 
base their classification on four dimensions (goals, attribute focus, breadth, scope) that 
probably shape the impact of standards. Although this classification is certainly useful, our 
definition of standards focuses on the distinction between product and production standards. 
While product standards directly relate to the physical characteristics of products, production 
standards specify the method of producing/processing food products. Production standards 
can be further differentiated by product related and non-product related production standards. 
Product related production standards prescribe specific production processes that influence 
product characteristics, whereas non-product related standards do not affect the product 
characteristics per se. Figure 1 gives an overview of the different categories of standards in 
the agri-food sector. 
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Public standards concerning minimum requirements of food quality are typically 
mandatory for domestic producers. As long as they comprise product standards, they are 
usually obligatory for importers of agri-food products, too. However, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), limits the imposition of food safety and other standards on imports by 
the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) and on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT)
1 so as to prevent protectionist measures implemented “in the disguise” of 
standards. 
Within the EU agri-food sector, public product standards are, for example, standards on 
the maximum level of pesticide residues, veterinary drugs and other contaminants in food 
products.
2 In contrast, the prohibition of hormones in EU beef production exhibits a product 
related production standard and minimum standards for the protection of animals are non-
product related production standards.
3 In addition to mandatory public standards, there also 
exist voluntary public standards often combined with certain governmental labels such as the 
EU’s labels of protected designation of origin (PDO), of protected geographical indication 
(PGI) and of traditional specialty guaranteed (TSG).
4 While these are usually non-product 
related there are also product related production standards such as some standards on organic 
production.
5 
Furthermore, the private sector increasingly sets its own product and production 
standards, which commonly exceed the quality level required by public standards. These 
private standards are voluntary by nature but can become quasi-mandatory if at certain stages 
                                                 
1 See WTO Uruguay Round Agreements Annex 1A. 
2 Directive 86/362/EEC on maximum levels of pesticides for cereals (OJ L221), Directive 86/363/EEC for 
foodstuffs of animal origin (OJ L211), Directive 90/642/EEC for certain products of plant origin (OJ L350) and 
Directive 76/895/EEC for fruit and vegetables (OJ L340), Regulation (EEC) 2377/90 on residues of veterinary 
drug in foodstuffs of animal origin (OJ L224) and Regulation (EEC) 315/93 on residues of contaminants in 
foodstuffs (OJ L37). 
3 Directive 96/22/EC prohibiting certain hormones in livestock farming (OJ L125), Directive 99/74/EC on the 
protection of laying hens (OJ L203), Directive 91/630/EEC on the protection of pigs (OJ L340), Directive 
91/629/EEC on the protection of calves (OJ L340). 
4 Regulation (EEC) 2081/92 on PGI and PDO and (EEC) 2082/92 on TSG (OJ L208). 
5 Regulation (EEC) 2092/91 on organic production (OJ L198).   5
of the value chain a large share of actors demands compliance with their private standards 
(Henson and Reardon, 2005).
6 The most prominent example for private standards are the 
standards by EurepGAP (Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group/Good Agricultural 
Practices). If the compliance with voluntary standards, no matter whether public or private, is 
communicated by labels, consumers can distinguish between compliant and non-compliant 
products and the producers can obtain premium prices for their compliant products. That is 
voluntary standards can be considered as an attempt to overcome the “lemon problem” of 
information asymmetry. 
3. Modeling approaches  
In applied economics, both partial (PE) and general equilibrium (GE) models are 
commonly used to quantitatively analyze the market impact of regulatory regimes such as 
standards. Although the modeling approaches of standards presented in the following can be 
applied in both kinds of equilibrium models, each framework has advantages and drawbacks 
in its application to modeling standards. Since meeting standards can result in different factor 
requirements, a GE framework may be preferable to a PE framework that usually excludes 
factor markets. However, due to their flexibility PE models allow for quite detailed 
specifications of markets and policy measures. This may be advantageous when modeling 
standards that are often formulated rather specifically. Both PE and GE models can be either 
static or dynamic. While a static modeling framework assumes immediate adjustments of 
consumption and production
7, a dynamic modeling framework accounts for lags in adjustment 
over one or more periods. The latter may be of particular interest when complying with 
standards involves considerable investments for domestic producers or importers. 
                                                 
6 For instance, the British Retail Consortium (BRC, 2005) states that “The majority of UK and Scandinavian 
retailers will only consider business with suppliers who have gained certification to the appropriate BRC global 
standard”. 
7 Note that lags in adjustment are implicitly accounted for in many static models, as the time horizon of the 
projection is known and behavioral parameters of supply and demand functions are specified such that they take 
into account the projection period.   6
In the following, we present four possible methods of incorporating standards into 
equilibrium models, point out their major advantages and disadvantages and discuss the 
situations for which they seem reasonably applicable. 
3.1. Modeling standards as tariff equivalents 
A first possibility of modeling standards refers to standards as functioning like non-
tariff barriers to trade (NTBs). To be eligible for being imported into a country, products have 
to be compliant with the standards of the importing country. Just like tariffs, complying with 
such import standards creates additional costs for exporters. On this basis, the compliance 
costs of standards are depicted by introducing estimates of tariff equivalents in models.
8  
This modeling approach is illustrated in figure 2 for a simple two-country model where 
A is an importing and B is an exporting country. In the base situation (situation 1), free trade 
between country A and B is assumed and hence producers and consumers in both countries 
face the world market price (Pw
1). In situation 2, country A introduces a standard imports 
from country B have to comply with. As shown in the second panel of figure 2, this results in 
compliance costs that shift the excess supply curve upwards (ESB
1→ ESB
2).
9 The world 
market price decreases (Pw
1→ P w
2) and so do the quantities traded (Qtraded
1→ Q traded
2). In 
country A, which imposes the standard, the price (PA
2) lies above the world market level and 
hence production increases and demand decreases. In country B, where the now lower world 
market price prevails, the opposite happens: demand goes up and supply goes down. 
                                                 
8 Many attempts have been made to estimate tariff equivalents of NTBs. For an overview see  Ferrantino (2005). 
9 For illustrative purposes the large country assumption is chosen. The small country assumption results in similar effects.   7







D = demand, S = supply, ED = excess demand, ES = excess supply, Q = quantity, PA = price in country A, Pw = world market 
price  
Source: own graph. 
 
In the literature, this modeling approach is commonly found in studies on quantifying 
the impact of SPS as well as TBT measures (e.g. Sumner and Lee, 1999; Calvin and Krissoff, 
1998). However, its ability to depict the “real world” seems to be quite limited. That is since it 
describes a situation, where a standard is only imposed on foreign products - but not on 
domestic products, as the domestic supply curve remains unchanged. Due to the WTO 
agreements on SPS and TBT, this scenario is rather implausible. 
However, one situation where it could be applicable relates to countries that on the one 
hand lack the administrative capacity to enforce standards domestically, but on the other hand 
do control the respective standards at their ports - which is usually much easier. One could 
also imagine a situation where imports become subject to standards that already apply for 
domestic production in the base situation. Only in the aforementioned situations, the modeling 
approach of standards as tariff equivalents is a sound representation of reality. 
In both situations, consumers are implied not to prefer compliant products to non-
compliant ones, as the demand curve (in both countries) does not change. Furthermore, 
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takes place when the compliant product crosses the border.
10 If standards set by an importing 
country affect neither production costs nor consumers’ willingness to pay and if they do not 
generate any other economic benefits, they would indeed be “disguised” protectionist 
measures. Only such standards are appropriately represented by tariff equivalents. 
In addition to the shortcomings of properly representing reality, another problem exits: 
When introducing tariff equivalents in models, tariff revenues are generated. Particularly, in a 
GE framework they have to be distributed in order to keep the social accounting matrix 
(SAM) consistent. In the case of modeling standards, the incurrence of such revenues and 
their distribution to one or more economic actors seems to be rather controversial. 
3.2. Modeling standards as shifting supply 
A second possible modeling approach focuses on the reasoning that producing 
according to standards raises production costs in terms of compliance costs. Like in the “tariff 
equivalent” approach, determining compliance costs is a rather difficult and tedious task to 
undertake. Most of the few studies on compliance costs therefore only cover the direct costs 
of compliance and neglect other cost components such as opportunity costs or costs resulting 
from uncertainty/risk when complying with standards (Brouwer et al., 2000). Despite this 
simplification, an appropriate estimation remains challenging. To complicate matters, it can 
be argued that the implementation of standards may also have positive effects on production 
costs. Being obliged to fulfill standards, producers may improve the efficiency of production 
processes for example by upgrading their facilities or by using modern technologies. That is 
standards may encourage competitiveness and innovation. 
Abstracting from possible pro-competitive and innovative effects, the implementation 
of standards leads to a cost-increasing supply shift. In figure 3, this is illustrated for a single 
country in a closed economy. With standards being imposed, the supply curve shifts upwards 
                                                 
10 If standards that require the adaptation of production processes do not raise production costs, the unlikely case 
of multiple cost minima for a given quantity of output is implied.   9
by the compliance costs (S
1→ S
2). Hence, the price increases (P
1→ P
2) and the quantity 
produced and consumed decreases (Q
1→ Q
2). 






Source: own graph. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the approach of standards as shifting supply in a world market 
model. The base situation (situation 1) is identical to the one in figure 2. In situation 2, 
country A introduces a standard domestic products as well as imports into country A have to 
comply with. The supply curves in both country A and B shift upwards by the compliance 
cost.
11 Consequently, A’s excess demand curve (EDA
1→ EDA
2) and B’s excess supply curve 
(ESB
1→ ESB
2) shift upward. As the costs of production increase “globally”, the (world 
market) price also increases and hence the quantities demanded in both countries decrease. In 
figure 4, the quantities supplied in both countries decrease, too. This does not need to be the 
case. If in one of the two countries the compliance costs were sufficiently smaller than the 
price increase, this country’s production would expand. The same holds for the quantities 
traded on the international market. In our example the quantities traded decrease. Obviously, 
the quantity and price changes depend on the shape of the supply and demand curves as well 
as the relative magnitude of the compliance costs between countries. 
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Source: own graph. 
 
In order to model supply shifts in equilibrium models shift parameters are commonly 
introduced in supply functions. For example, when depicting the trade effect of technical 
progress that augments output, the respective supply curves are shifted to the right. Since 
meeting standards however leads to an output decreasing supply shift as argued above, 
standards can be modeled by a “negative” technical change. Accounting for the introduction 
of mandatory quality assurance and labeling regimes in the US meat industry, Lusk and 
Anderson (2003) for example model a “negative” technical change in a PE framework. 
Similarly, Ganslandt and Markusen (2001) shift supply curves of a GE model so as to 
generally analyze the welfare effects of standards. 
This “supply shift” approach reflects compliance costs by an increase in production 
costs rather than by an increase in trade costs as in the “tariff equivalent” approach. This may 
be appropriate in cases where standards indeed concern production processes and do not 
primarily serve protectionist purposes. Furthermore, in the application of the “supply shift” 
approach the problem of distributing a non-existent tariff revenue does not arise. The “supply 
shift” approach seems to be relatively more flexible since the supply curves in either one or 
both countries can be shifted. This may, be useful for example when modeling non-product 
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costs   11
countries. Another example comprises standards addressing external effects that have national 
consequences only - for instance labor standards. In these cases, only the supply curve of the 
country introducing the standard shifts upwards. Despite the advantages of the “supply shift” 
approach, some drawbacks remain and in fact other problems arise. Like in the “tariff 
equivalent” approach the standard has no effect on the demand curve. As explained, this is not 
quite realistic. Furthermore, the “supply shift” approach implies that the standard necessarily 
takes the form of a mandatory national (shifting one supply curve) or global (shifting both 
curves) standard. The latter is particularly unrealistic because an exporting country usually 
does not adapt its entire production to the standards of the importing country. It is expected to 
only adjust the part of production producing for the export market. 
3.3. Modeling standards as shifting demand 
Standards most probably have effects on consumer preferences. Affecting the actual 
and/or perceived characteristics of products, standards may make consumers less worry about 
consuming products as well as may alleviate their uncertainty about product quality (Josling 
et al., 2003).
12 If that is the case, consumers benefit from the implementation and enforcement 
of standards. If their willingness to pay for a product increases with standards being 
implemented, the demand curve shifts upwards. However, such demand shifts are difficult to 
determine since they crucially depend on the marginal utility consumers experience when 
consuming the compliant product. In the literature, only few studies include the “demand 
shift” approach to model standard. For example Thilmany and Barrett (1997) model a demand 
shift to reflect the consumers’ benefits from technical regulations in the US dairy sector. 
Figure 5 illustrates the “demand shift” approach in combination with the “supply shift” 
approach. With the magnitude of the supply shift exceeding the demand shift in our example, 
the quantities demanded and supplied in both countries decrease relative to the base. The 
                                                 
12 This is obviously only true if the respective standards are recognized by consumers (possibly via labelling) and 
if compliance is checked or guaranteed (possibly via certification).   12
increase in the world market price is ceteris paribus more pronounced than in the situation 
where only the supply curves are shifted. Obviously larger shifts of the demand curve lead to 
different results. 







Source: own graph. 
 
So far, changes in welfare resulting from the introduction of standards have not been 
discussed, as they were necessarily negative without any effects beyond those on supply 
curves. Taking into account shifts of the demand curves, the net welfare effect is not a priori 
clear anymore. Although it is negative in the example given here, introducing smaller supply 
and/or larger demand shifts may result in a positive net welfare effect. 
Unlike the modeling approaches discussed above, the approach presented in this section 
takes into account the effects of standards on consumer behavior. Ignoring these effects seems 
to be rather unrealistic, especially when modeling standards whose implementation can be 
considered as predominantly consumer driven. However, the issue of “universally” shifting 
demand and supply curves remains unsolved. This issue is addressed in the following section. 
3.4. Modeling standards as segregating markets 
In many cases, compliant and non-compliant products co-exist in a market. This holds 
for example for voluntary standards that allow consumers to decide whether to consume the 
compliant or the non-compliant product and producers to decide whether to meet the 







importing country A   international 
market  




























P   P  
S
1

















   13
standards: If an importing country imposes standards on foreign products, producers in the 
exporting country can decide whether to fulfill them so as to export their compliant products 
to that market or to produce non-compliant products for other markets.
13 
With standards leading to compliant and non-compliant products coexisting on the 
market, they can be modeled by market segregation. That is two markets with different supply 
and demand functions – one for compliant and one for non-compliant products – are 
constructed. On the supply side, total supply is split into the supply of the compliant and non-
compliant product. Along the lines of the “supply shift” modeling approach, an upward shift 
of the supply curve of the compliant product accounts for the cost increase due to producing 
according to the respective standard. Similarly, total demand is divided into the demand for 
the compliant and non-compliant product. In order to account for possible consumer benefits 
from the implementation of the standard, the demand curve of the compliant product may be 
shifted upwards like in the “demand shift” modeling approach. Figure 6 illustrates the 
modeling approach of standards as market segmentation for a single-country model.  








Source: Own graph. 
                                                 
13 Compliant and non-compliant products may also co-exist in the market in countries lacking the institutional 
capacities to enforce mandatory standards.  
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Studies on trade effects caused by the introduction of GMO technologies model 
segregated market so as to depict the differentiation between GMO and non-GMO products. 
For an overview of studies modeling GMOs see Nielson et al. (2002). Another strand of 
literature on equilibrium models that commonly applies market segregation deals with other 
issues of food quality (e.g. Peterson and Orden, 2004). 
The most crucial part of this approach is how to split demand and supply into the two 
categories of compliant and non-compliant. Conducting market segmentation requires 
knowledge about how many consumers turn to the compliant product and of how many 
producers take the risk of changing their production so as to meet the respective standard (or 
the risk of not changing it) without knowing the chances of their products on the market. At 
the same token, the question about the degree of substitutability between the compliant and 
non-compliant product in consumption and production arises. This information cannot be 
easily obtained prior to the introduction of the standard and hence assumptions must be made.  
4. Summary and Conclusions 
The modeling approaches of standards reviewed in this paper are most commonly used 
in the literature of applied economics. They have been ordered such that they become 
increasingly flexible with regard to their ability to account for the effects of standards on the 
production and consumption side. Allowing for both the consumers’ and producers’ choice 
between consuming and producing compliant and non-compliant products, respectively, the 
“market segmentation” approach is the most flexible of the approaches reviewed in the paper. 
The one fundamental difference between the approaches presented is the inclusion of 
the demand side effects of standards. The implementation of policy measures such as 
standards must at least benefit one group in society, otherwise they would not be agreed upon. 
It can therefore be argued that modeling approaches that do not take into account the utility 
increase for consumers or any other welfare enhancing effects are surely a misrepresentation 
of reality. Although modeling approaches ignoring the demand side effects of standards seem   15
to be unsuitable for comprehensive welfare calculations, they can nevertheless generate useful 
results on how standards quantitatively influence trade flows or production. 
The paper shows that the data requirements or assumptions to be made intensify with 
the degree of flexibility. These comprise estimates for compliance costs, the consumers’ 
willingness to pay as well as the shares of consumers and producers who turn to the 
production and consumption of the compliant product, respectively. It has also been shown 
that the less flexible approaches may be appropriate to simulate the effects of certain types of 
standards or to cover their major effects only - like for example in the case of ignoring the 
demand side effects of standards as described above. 
Yet, there are issues not covered in this paper that may be of importance when 
analyzing the effects of standards. One of them concerns external effects standards are 
designed to create or to alleviate. Although standards addressing external effects may not 
necessarily affect consumers individually, they might have an impact on the welfare of the 
society as a whole. These effects on overall societal welfare e.g. due to animal protection 
standards are, if at all, difficult to capture in equilibrium models. Another issue not covered 
relates to the fact that consumers may not unambiguously value standards or rather compliant 
products higher than non-compliant ones. This refers to horizontal product differentiation, as 
opposed to vertical product differentiation assumed throughout the paper, and involves issues 
of product variety. 
In conclusion, one can state that there is no generally superior modeling approach of 
standards. Each approach discussed in this paper may appropriately represent standards in 
certain “real world” situations. The choice of which approach to apply depends on the target 
of the standards to be modeled, the focus of the analysis as well as on the assumptions about 
how the behavior of economic actors is affected.   16
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